# Wiki doc 4

## 1NC

### 1NC – FW

#### Interpretation – affs must defend hypothetical enactment of a United States federal government policy that substantially increases prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law 4. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716]

Federal government. 1. A **national government** that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) **central government**. 2. **the U.S. government** – Also **termed national government**. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

Phaffenroth 21 [Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Partner, Arnold and Porter, focuses her practice on helping clients address complex antitrust issues in the US and globally. She rejoined the firm in 2017 from the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) where she served most recently as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations. In that role, Ms. Pfaffenroth was responsible for supervising both civil and criminal antitrust enforcement efforts, as well as the Division's work with antitrust and competition law enforcement agencies worldwide. Justin Hedge, Counsel, Arnold and Porter, and Monique N. Boyce, Sr. Associate, Arnold and Porter. “A Comparison Of Proposed Antitrust Legislation In 2021: Federal And New York State.” 7/2/21. https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1086194/a-comparison-of-proposed-antitrust-legislation-in-2021-federal-and-new-york-state]

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### That’s key to predictability -- only an interp grounded in relevant legal literature gives debaters the basis to prepare negatives and affirmatives guaranteed to clash. There are a few impacts –

#### First is competitive equity – without predictable preparation and a stable stasis point, there is an aff side bias that destroys the competitive nature of the activity and participation – equity is obviously an impact because debate is a game that is key to the aff – if not, just vote neg

#### Second is information reflexivity --

#### The process of debate around a predictable governmental plan best creates the conditions for informed learning and well-rounded information gathering through a holistic research approach – the impact is information reflexivity – issues of factual evidence are difficult to resolve and require informed processes and information vetting to counter problematic premises that result in material violence like the Iraq war – only a model of debate that encourages 2nd and 3rd level argument testing, considers unintended consequences, and promotes conditional and dynamic argumentation will foster well informed decisions and self-efficacy

Leek 16. [Danielle R. Leek, Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs instructor, Director of Academic Innovation and Distance Education at Bunker Hill Community College, former executive director of the communications center and professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 401-405]

In policy debate, students are asked to consider whether a particular course of action should be taken, generally by state institutions such as the United States federal government, or its respective branches, such as the Supreme Court or the Congress (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). A policy debate can involve any institutional actor or agent such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and so on. Questions of policy can address broad global issues, such as “Should the United States federal government sign a new nuclear treaty with Iran?” Or they might consider narrow rules for legal action, such as“Should the Michigan Department of Treasury require individuals to pay taxes online?” When connected to a service-learning experience, educators might set aside time for students to debate a relevant policy question. Using previous examples, students working on the health campaign might also be asked to debate the question, “Should the City of Grand Rapids provide mobile health clinics in the downtown area?” Chemistry students could debate, “Should the federal government require a universal science curriculum in all high schools?” No matter the topic, students should have the opportunity to engage multiple perspectives on the question, including speaking on the affirmative to support a new policy and on the negative in opposition to a change in the status quo. Students may be asked to work with one or more partners to research and develop materials that can be used in their speeches or in question-and-answer periods related to their arguments.

Especially for readers familiar with extracurricular policy debate competitions in high schools or college, this depiction of what policy debate entails may seem overly simplistic. Yet, even basic consideration of policy issues related to a service-learning experience can improve a student’s odds of political learning. Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement.

Information literacy

While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem-solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowledge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are challenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process.

Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well-rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011).

Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically contextual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engagement. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For students to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motivation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014).

Arguing facts

In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policymaking for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good.

While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence.

This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to servicelearning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Furthermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research highlights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of institutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place.

I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experiences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes:

… the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61)

Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind.

Political engagement through policy debate

This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives.

To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cultivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learning combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely.

Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discussion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world.

Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

### Case

#### Wholesale rejection of rationality and mastery is incoherent---debate, the ballot, and their argument all rely on those behaviors, and rejecting them ignores their strategic utility for emancipatory politics

Ruti 17(Mari, Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies at the University of Toronto, “The Ethiscs of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects,” Page 155-156)

While I am at it, let me put some pressure on the wholesale rejection of reason that tends to characterize posthumanist theory, including some versions of queer theory. I am of course aware of the historical violences of Enlightenment reason, including its connection to Western imperialism’s “civilizing” mission. Furthermore, as a feminist, I am familiar with arguments regarding reason’s masculinist biases. And as a psychoanalytic thinker, I recognize the brutality of models of life that overvalue our rational agency at the expense of the body, the passions, the unconscious, and so on. I therefore agree that rationality is not the defining ingredient of human beings. Yet a blanket condemnation of reason seems both reductive and hypocritical—reductive because it discounts the considerable role that rationality plays in human life and hypocritical because it denies that, as academics, we rely on our rational capacities to stage our arguments.

Is it not the case that my ability to speak to you on these pages—and your capacity to process my arguments, critique them, and (hopefully) use them in your own thinking—is predicated on a degree of reason? Indeed, do we not spend much of our careers trying to reason with, and sometimes even outreason, each other? Furthermore, are we not usually trying (at least partially) to “master” something, such as the movement of thought, the organization of ideas, or the craft of writing? This may be idiosyncratic, but I spend a lot of time telling the graduate students whose dissertations I supervise that the organization of their ideas could use some work and that the syntax of their sentences (sometimes) sucks. And I spend even more time rereading my manuscripts in an attempt to make sure that my syntax does not (always) entirely suck. Perhaps this is why I find the unqualified rejection of both reason and mastery that has become habitual in contemporary progressive theory so absurd. True, none of us is fully rational. Nor can we ever fully master anything. Yes, my syntax still sometimes slips. But fortunately it is considerably better than it was when I was nineteen and barely spoke English. Have I tried to master the damn language? Hell yes.

It is in part for such banal reasons that I appreciate Amy Allen’s observation that there is an enormous difference between categorically rejecting reason on the one hand and trying to reenvision it along less tyrannical lines on the other. Referring to Huffer’s interpretation of Foucault in particular, Allen maintains that it is erroneous to assume—as Huffer does—that Foucault’s celebration of madness amounts to an attempt to do away with reason. According to Allen, Foucault undertook “neither a rejection of reason nor a romanticized idealization of unreason” (2013, 22). In other words, Foucault was not interested in destroying reason but rather in historicizing it by examining how it had been constructed at various points in time, how it had been shaped by disciplinary power, and how it had been deployed to meet specific socioeconomic and political goals.

There is no question that this project entailed a critique of the failings of Enlightenment reason. There is also no doubt that reason, for Foucault, was always impure (biased) in being socially contingent. This is why it must be diligently questioned, why we are right to ask how our dominant models of rationality have been implicated in various relations of power. But this does not mean that reason is altogether useless. For example, Allen observes that even though feminists have been at the forefront of criticizing the abuses of reason, they have frequently also found it enabling because it has allowed them to mount their intricate critiques of social hegemonies, including, somewhat ironically, reason’s patriarchal underpinnings. Furthermore, it is precisely the impurity of reason that opens up the possibility of alternative— less repressive, less objectionable—forms of reason. As Foucault explains, “If critical thought itself has a function . . . it is precisely to accept this sort of spiral, this sort of revolving door of rationality that refers us to its necessity, to its indispensability, and, at the same time, to its intrinsic dangers” (2000, 358). Reason, for Foucault, was always contaminated by its context but this, far from negating its value, was what made the reconceptualization of reason feasible in the first place.

#### Their theory totalizes the relationship between tech and social relations – that’s catastrophically wrong

Susen 19 [Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London. Simon, “No escape from the technosystem?,” Philosophy & Social Criticism]

A major irony of Feenberg’s book is the following contradiction: on several occasions, he criticizes, and distances himself from, technological determinism; key parts of his argument suggest, however, that he himself flirts with, if not subscribes to, technological determinism. He rightly maintains, and convincingly demonstrates, that ‘society and technology are inextricably imbricated’.240 This insight justifies the underlying assumption that there is no comprehensive study of society without a critical sociology of technology. Yet, to contend that ‘[s]ocial groups exist through the technologies that bind their members together’241 is misleading. For not all social groups are primarily defined by the technologies that enable their members to relate to, and to bond with, one another. Indeed, not all social relations, or social bonds, are based on, let alone determined by, technology.

Of course, Feenberg is right to argue that ‘technologically mediated groups influence technical design through their choices and protests’.242 Ultimately, though, the previous assertion is tautological. This becomes clear if, in the above sentence, we replace the word ‘technological(ly)’ with terms such as ‘cultural(ly)’, ‘linguistical(ly)’, ‘political(ly)’, ‘economic(ally)’, or indeed another sociological qualifier commonly used to characterize the specificity of a social relation. Hence, we may declare that ‘culturally, linguistically, politically, and economically mediated groups influence cultural, linguistic, political, and economic conventions through their choices and protests’. In saying so, we are stating the obvious. If, however, we aim to make a case for cultural, linguistic, political, or economic determinism, then this is problematic to the extent that we end up reducing the constitution of social arrangements to the product of one overriding causal set of forces (whether these be cultural, linguistic, political, economic, technological, or otherwise).

While declaring that he is a critic of technological determinism, Feenberg – in central passages of his book – gives the impression that he is one of its fiercest advocates. Feenberg’s techno-Marxist evolutionism is based on the premise that ‘progress is realized essentially through technosystem change’243 – that is, on the assumption that, effectively, human progress is reducible to technological development. Feenberg is right to stress that ‘[t]echnical progress is joined indissolubly to the democratic enlargement of access to its benefits and protection from its harms’.244 ‘Concretization’,245 understood in this way, conceives of progress as a ‘local, context-bound phenomenon uniting technical and normative dimensions’.246 We may add, however, that progress has not only technical (or technological) but also economic, cultural, and political dimensions, which contain objective, normative, and subjective facets. At times, the differentiation between these aspects is blurred, if not lost, in Feenberg’s account, given his tendency to overstate the power of technology at the expense of other crucial social forces. In other words, progress is not only ‘inextricably entangled with the technosystem’,247 but it is also indissolubly entwined with the economic, cultural, and political systems in which it unfolds and for (or against) which it exerts its objective, normative, and subjective power.

The preceding reflection takes us back to the problem of techno-reductionism:

The struggle over the technosystem began with the labor movement. Workers’ demands for health and safety on the job were public interventions into production technology.248

All struggles over social (sub)systems have not only a technological but also various other (notably economic, cultural, and political) dimensions. Demands made by particular subjects (defined by class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability – or a combination of these sociological variables) are commonly expressed in public interventions not only into production technology, but also into economic, cultural, and political systems. In all social struggles (including class struggle), technology can be an important means to an end, but it is rarely an end in itself. Put differently, social struggles are partly – but seldom essentially, let alone exclusively – about technology.

#### The politics of academic refusal are a disaster – they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

#### Cap key to CCS – link-turns every impact.

Graciela ‘16 (/16 – Professor of Economics and of Statistics at Columbia University and Visiting Professor at Stanford University, and was the architect of the Kyoto Protocol carbon market (being interviewed by Marcus Rolle, freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues and global affairs, “Reversing Climate Change: Interview with Graciela Chichilnisky,” http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/09/2016/reversing-climate-change-interview-graciela-chichilnisky)//cmr

GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. Green Capitalism is needed now to help avert climate change and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the building blocks for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often long-run strategies do not work in the short run and different policies and economic incentives are needed. In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about 87% of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually remove the CO2 that is already there, we cannot remain long within the carbon budget, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, we face significant time pressure. The IPCC indicates in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere and do so in massive quantities, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take decades. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call Green Capitalism, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a private/public approach, based on new industrial technology and financial markets, self-funded and using profitable greenmarkets, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is a carbon negative economy that represents green capitalism in resolving the Global Climate negotiations and the North–South Divide. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

#### IEA studies and empirics prove that universal decoupling is occuring --- global emissions have stalled for years despite consistent growth

**Riti** et. al **17** [Joshua Sunday Riti, School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Jos, “Decoupling CO2 emission and economic growth in China: Is there consistency in estimation results in analyzing environmental Kuznets curve?”, Journal of Cleaner Production Volume 166, 10 November 2017, Pages 1448-1461, Science Direct]

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), universal carbon dioxide-greenhouse gas related emissions shows some stability in 2015 at approximately 32.1 Gt for the second year in a row, validating the decoupling of global greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth (Enerdata, 2015; Itskos et al., 2016). The stalling of global emissions is no surprise, as this is in line with the slowing trend in annual emission growth over the past three years, starting from 2.0% in 2013 to 1.1% in 2014 and further down to 0.1% in 2015. A similar trend of declining growth in global emissions could also be seen from 2010 to 2012, starting from 5.7% down to 0.7%. It is debatable whether the plateaued emission level will continue and results from structural changes (Jackson et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2016; Green and Stern, 2016). In 2009, a stronger global downward trend of 1.0% was recorded, compared to 2008 levels, but this was due to the global economic downturn. Stalling in emissions is not coupled with the GDP trend, as global GDP kept up with an annual growth of 3.0% in 2015 compared to 2014. A more structural change with a shift away from carbon-intensive activities, particularly in China but also in the United States, contributed considerably to this trend. This achievement was made possible through the global investment in energy efficiency which increased by 6% in 2015 (IEA, 2010) and the rise in the proportion of renewables in the generation of power. It is estimated that the share of renewables was around 90 percent of the latest power generation in year 2015, with power from wind alone responsible for over 50 percent.

#### Growth is locked in --- a transition would have to literally remake everything

**Koch** and Büchs **19** [Max Koch, Faculty of Social Sciences, Socialhögskolan, Lund University, Milena Büchs, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing”, Futures Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 155-165, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#!]

Economic growth, as an attribute of market capitalism, has structural properties – it is needed to stabilise modern societies as it provides employment, public sector provision through tax revenues, rising wages, and hence social stability (Petridis et al., 2015: 178, Rosa et al., 2017). Economic growth is organised around and shapes a range of tightly coupled structures, including institutions, norms, discourses, culture, technologies, competences, identities, etc. Historically speaking, growth is a fairly recent phenomenon which only picked up in the 19th century together with the industrialisation of Western economies. In a co-evolutionary process, a range of institutions developed which are now coupled to a growth-based capitalist economy, including the nation state, representative democracy, the rule of law and current legal, financial, labour market, education, research, and welfare systems. These are based on philosophies which emerged to justify and give meaning to these institutions, for instance on individualism, freedom, justice, sovereignty, or power. The embeddedness of the growth-based capitalistic economic system in these co-evolved institutions and ways of thinking makes it difficult to transition to a degrowth system because the change of the economic system would need to involve a parallel transformation of those coupled systems. In Luhmann’s words, the constitution of the current system “defuturises” (Luhmann, 1976: 141) the future, it reduces the “openness” of the future; “path dependency” or even “lock-in” are related expressions that capture this idea. Two examples which directly link to people’s wellbeing can illustrate this point: the relationship between welfare states and growth, and between growth and people’s mind-sets and identities.

#### The transition would be violent which is separate offense for us AND means that it would inevitably fail

**Koch** and Büchs **19** [Max Koch, Faculty of Social Sciences, Socialhögskolan, Lund University, Milena Büchs, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing”, Futures Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 155-165, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#!]

3.2. Implications of rapidly transforming social systems

The social practices lens is also useful for thinking about possible wellbeing implications of rapid social change more generally, and a transition away from a growth-based economy specifically. While the concept of social practices inherently implies the possibility of change (with its focus on agency and creativity), it equally strongly highlights the structural aspects of practices which provide stability and orientation. During times of rapid social transitions, social norms and ‘mental infrastructures’ often lag behind, creating disorientation, social conflict, and negative impacts on wellbeing (Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6).

Stability of structural dimensions of social practices offers orientation and some extent of predictability of how oneself and other people are likely to act in the future, providing a framework within which flexibility and change are possible. This orienting function of structural dimensions of practices is likely to be an important condition for people to form reasonably stable identities and relationships – key ingredients for wellbeing. Examples from classical and contemporary sociological and psychological research suggest that different speeds of changing social structures can establish misalignments and disruptions of social practices which can, in turn, negatively influence health and other wellbeing outcomes. For instance, in his classical study, Durkheim presents suicide at least partly as an outcome of a failure of cultural resources to provide meaning and orientation in the context of other, more rapid social changes (Durkheim, 2006; Vega & Rumbaut, 1991: 375). This idea also links to Bourdieu’s concept of the “hysteresis effect”. Here, Bourdieu emphasises that, especially during phases of social transition, people’s habitus and “objective” social circumstances can become disjointed: as a result of hysteresis, dispositions can be “out of line with the field and with the ‘collective expectations’ which are constitutive of its normality. This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed” (Bourdieu, 2000: 160). This can contribute to a deterioration of people’s wellbeing as it makes them feel “out of place” or let them be perceived that way, “plung[ing] them deeper into failure” (Bourdieu, 2000: 161) because they cannot make use of new opportunities or are mistreated or socially excluded by others.

Empirical research which partly builds on the idea of hysteresis has shown that wide-ranging organisational change can have a range of negative effects on people’s health and mortality (Ferrie et al., 1998; McDonough & Polzer, 2012). One study found that across 174 countries, several measures of wellbeing and social performance, including life satisfaction, health, safety and trust, voice and accountability, were highest in periods of economic stability, but lower in times of GDP growth or contraction (O’Neill, 2015); and other studies concluded that life expectancy can be negatively affected by both rapid economic growth and contraction (Notzon et al., 1998; Szreter, 1999).

Several scholars have recently highlighted the potential for social conflict inherent in (rapid) social change. For instance, Maja Göpel (2016: 49) remarks: “Unsurprisingly, the navigation or transition phase in shifting paradigms as well as governance solutions is marked by chaos, politicization, unease and power-ridden struggles”. Wolfgang Streeck has issued similar warnings (Streeck et al., 2016: 169). It is not difficult to see how such scenarios bear the potential of undermining some of the fundamental conditions that are necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs as discussed above, and hence the danger of generating substantial wellbeing losses for current and near-future generations.

In the current context, it is very difficult to imagine that we might be able to observe a rapid and radical cultural change in which people adopt identities and related lifestyles that value intrinsically motivated activities over pursuing satisfaction and status through careers and consumption. Even more worryingly, political events in Europe, the United States and elsewhere since the ‘Great Crash’ of 2008 indicate that times of negative or stagnant growth can provide a breeding ground for populist, nationalistic and anti-democratic movements. Economic insecurity, a perceived threat of established identities through migrants, and deep mistrust against ‘elite’ politicians are amongst the main explanations for previously unimaginable events such as the Brexit vote, Trump presidency, and recent electoral successes for far right-wing parties in a range of European countries.

#### Neolib is resilient – global resistance proves

Igor Guardiancich 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Management of the University of Southern Denmark, 3/3/2017, “Absorb, Coopt and Recast: Global Neoliberalism’s Resilience through Local Translation”, http://www.euvisions.eu/neoliberalisms-resilience-translation/

One powerful message permeating the book, and which gives a forceful explanation to Colin Crouch’s punchy title is that: “rather than a mass-produced, slightly shrunk, and off-the-rack ideological suit, neoliberalism is a bespoke outfit made from a dynamic fabric that absorbs local color” (5). Even under a full-out attack against some of its basic assumptions, such as the one unleashed in the immediate wake of the global financial crisis, neoliberalism proved resilient beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast selected ideas of oppositional social forces has been the most valuable asset guaranteeing its survival. Again, the comparison of the responses to the crisis in Spain and Romania show such adaptability in full.¶ The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tried to salvage the social-democratic legacies of the Spanish economy by engineering a Keynesian rescue package. Only later, when the disaster of the cajas became apparent and the emergency intensified, did conservative PM Mariano Rajoy embrace more deregulation in the labour market (inspired by the Hartz IV reform) and extensive cuts in the public sector under the strong external pressure of the European Central Bank and of international financial markets.¶ In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ crisis, thereby outbidding the IMF on austerity and structural reforms. Instead of shielding lower-income groups, the opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen. By heroically withstanding the external attempts at moderation, the Romanian economy retained an unenviable mix of libertarian achievements (flat-tax rates), experimental neoliberalism (privatized pensions) and mainstream neoliberal orthodoxy (sound finance, labour market deregulation, social policy targeting, privatization of all public companies). Pure laissez-faire ideas such as the replacement of the welfare state by a voluntary, private, Christian charity system were not unheard of.¶ Hence, through an insightful analysis of the ideational underpinnings of its local interpretations, this book shows us that, despite the challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking. Ban guides us through half a century of policymaking in Spain and Romania, and embeds his analysis within the related nuances of contemporary liberal economic thought. The research is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the origin of current ideational frames and comfortably sits alongside contemporary classics, such as Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea.

#### Capitalism isn’t more racist than other systems and only political engagement solves its disparities

Barlow 20 [Rich, Senior Writer for BU Today, “Capitalism Isn’t Racist. We Are”. 9/17/20. https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2020/09/17/racist-capitalism-rich-barlow]

“There is no capitalism without racism,” says Angela Davis. The activist and academic boasts a communist past, but on this one, she’s hardly radical.

The idea that capitalism is incurably racist down to its profit-counting bones was scripture in certain progressive precincts even before George Floyd’s murder opened a lens on bigotry beyond policing. A recently released book by another scholar makes the capitalism equals racism case.

That white capitalists have exploited people of color for centuries is indisputable, from Dixie’s plantations and land theft under Jim Crow to redlined neighborhoods and job discrimination today. Instead of reopening all those capitalist businesses shuttered by COVID-19, should we abolish them?

No. Anti-capitalists ignore a sadder, inconvenient truth. To tweak Davis to be more accurate, there is no economic system, period, without racism. And there is a lot we can do to dilute bigotry in our system.

The pioneering Black studies scholar Cedric Robinson found that capitalism evolved from Western societies already steeped in racial discrimination; feudal Europe wasn’t humming “Kumbaya.” Nor, for that matter, were African kings who kept slaves to strut their wealth and power, before 18th-century European traders waded ashore and remade slave-owning into an industrial-scale profit machine.

My point isn’t to deny U.S. capitalism’s systemic racism. It is, rather, to snuff out knee-jerk, utopian notions that racism is anything less than a universal infestation among different economies and cultures.

As Boston University researcher Jim Bessen, who has studied racial wage disparities, told me, “A more pessimistic view might say civilization may inherently introduce tribal antagonisms that lead to racism.” And not just Western civilization.

The stray Marxist may look for racial and ethnic harmony in self-declared workers' paradises such as China. The million Uyghurs and other Muslims herded into concentration camps by Xi Jinping likely would beg to differ. Their plight is the latest link in an historical chain of racism in the People’s Republic.

Socialist regimes elsewhere flunk the brotherhood test, too. Only recently, Cuba began inching beyond shunting Black Cubans to the margins of political and economic equality. Fidel Castro may have declared his nation delivered from racism by his revolution, but a young Cuban activist in 2018 dissented: “To me, Cuba is very, very racist, one of the most racist countries in the world.”

Perhaps anti-capitalists think the lava of race hate has cooled in the northern climes and egalitarian ethos of nations practicing democratic socialism. (Which, the name notwithstanding, is actually capitalism with sturdier regulatory and safety-net guardrails than ours. But never mind.)

Alas, if they’re gazing at Scandinavia or Canada, they need to seek Eden elsewhere. In recent years, the U.N. professed itself “concerned” about Swedish racism towards Africans, Jews, Muslims and Roma. A journalist who has lived in Denmark finds economic inequality for non-western immigrants and racist newspaper cartoons blemishing Bernie Sanders’s beloved Denmark, while Norway grapples with Islamophobia.

Canada meanwhile repents a history of “notoriously abusive schools for Indigenous children” and “pollution of [Native] traditional territory.”

My point isn’t to deny U.S. capitalism’s systemic racism. It is, rather, to snuff out knee-jerk, utopian notions that racism is anything less than a universal infestation among different economies and cultures. Circling the world with open eyes and mind confirms professor and New Yorker contributor Nicholas Lemann’s observation that “it’s possible to be anti-capitalist without being anti-racist, and anti-racist without being anti-capitalist.”

Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr. challenged capitalism, but the civil rights martyr’s enthusiasm seems to have been for democratic socialism, which, as I mentioned, would make him an uber-progressive capitalist, not the raging commie of J. Edgar Hoover’s fevered nightmares.

"It’s possible to be anti-capitalist without being anti-racist, and anti-racist without being anti-capitalist."

NICHOLAS LEMANN

We abolished slavery to make capitalism less racist in the 19th century. In the 21st, It doesn’t take a democratic socialist to map the next steps on that far-from-finished journey. Bessen favors one surgically precise intervention: ban employers from inquiring about job applicants’ salary histories. Since past discrimination suppresses Blacks’ wages, knowing those wages allows employers to lowball proffered salaries to minority hires. States with bans have narrowed the racial wage gap, his research shows.

That’s just for starters. We also could create public works jobs in Black neighborhoods ravaged by the evaporation of employment documented by scholar William Julius Wilson; pay for healthy food markets in food deserts, at a time when 14 million American children aren’t getting enough to eat; make public colleges tuition-free, a ticket to the middle class for disadvantaged people of all races; and enact Obamacare for All to begin addressing racial health care disparities. And elect more compassionate leaders than our incumbent president and his congressional bootlickers.

None of this would make us a less capitalist society. It would make us a less racist one.

Forty years ago, an academic study asked, "Does Socialism Mean Greater Equality?" If only the world were so simple. Focused on that era’s leading socialist power, the Soviet Union, the article answered its own question: nah.

That answer hasn’t changed.

#### Tech is good and inevitable – you’re biased toward pessimism which disproves their links, BUT rejecting engagement makes it worse

Reinhart 18 [Will Rinehart is Director of Technology and Innovation Policy at the American Action Forum, where he specializes in telecommunication, Internet, and data policy, with a focus on emerging technologies and innovation. Rinehart previously worked at TechFreedom, where he was a Research Fellow. He was also previously the Director of Operations at the International Center for Law & Economics. In Defense of Techno-optimism. <https://techliberation.com/2018/10/10/in-defense-of-techno-optimism/>]

Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore.

Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems.

But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism.

In the shadow of a year of bad news, it helpful to remember that Facebook and Google and Reddit and Twitter also support humane conversations. Most people aren’t going online to talk about politics and if you are, then you are rare. These sites are places where families and friends can connect. They offer a space of solace – like when chronic pain sufferers find others on Facebook, or when widows vent, rage, laugh and cry without judgement through the Hot Young Widows Club. Let’s also not forget that Reddit, while sometimes a place of rage and spite, is also where a weight lifter with cerebral palsy can become a hero and where those with addiction can find healing. And in the hardest to reach places in Canada, in Iqaluit, people say that “Amazon Prime has done more toward elevating the standard of living of my family than any territorial or federal program. Full stop. Period” Three-fourths of Americans say major technology companies’ products and services have been more good than bad for them personally. But when it comes to the whole of society, they are more skeptical about technology bringing benefits. Here is how I read that disparity: Most of us think that we have benefited from technology, but we worry about where it is taking the human collective. That is an understandable worry, but one that shouldn’t hobble us to inaction. Nor is technology making us stupid. Indeed, quite the opposite is happening. Technology use in those aged 50 and above seems to have caused them to be cognitively younger than their parents to the tune of 4 to 8 years. While the use of Google does seem to reduce our ability to recall information, studies find that it has boosted other kinds of memory, like retrieving information. Why remember a fact when you can remember where it is located? Concerned how audiobooks might be affecting people, Beth Rogowsky, an associate professor of education, compared them to physical reading and was surprised to find “no significant differences in comprehension between reading, listening, or reading and listening simultaneously.” Cyberbullying and excessive use might make parents worry, but NIH supported work found that “Heavy use of the Internet and video gaming may be more a symptom of mental health problems than a cause. Moderate use of the Internet, especially for acquiring information, is most supportive of healthy development.” Don’t worry. The kids are going to be alright.

And yes, there is a lot we still need to fix. There is cruelty, racism, sexism, and poverty of all kinds embedded in our technological systems. But the best way to handle these issues is through the application of human ingenuity. Human ingenuity begets technology in all of its varieties.

When Scott Alexander over at Star Slate Codex recently looked at 52 startups being groomed by startup incubator Y Combinator, he rightly pointed out that many of them were working for the betterment of all:

Thirteen of them had an altruistic or international development focus, including Neema, an app to help poor people without access to banks gain financial services; Kangpe, online health services for people in Africa without access to doctors; Credy, a peer-to-peer lending service in India; Clear Genetics, an automated genetic counseling tool for at-risk parents; and Dost Education, helping to teach literacy skills in India via a $1/month course.

Twelve of them seemed like really exciting cutting-edge technology, including CBAS, which describes itself as “human bionics plug-and-play”; Solugen, which has a way to manufacture hydrogen peroxide from plant sugars; AON3D, which makes 3D printers for industrial uses; Indee, a new genetic engineering system; Alem Health, applying AI to radiology, and of course the obligatory drone delivery startup. Eighteen of them seemed like boring meat-and-potatoes companies aimed at businesses that need enterprise data solution software application package analytics targeting management something something something “the cloud”. As for the other companies, they were the kind of niche products that Silicon Valley has come to be criticized for supporting. Perhaps the Valley deserves some criticism, but perhaps it deserves more credit than it’s been receiving as-of-late.

Contemporary tech criticism displays a kind of anti-nostalgia. Instead of being reverent for the past, anxiety for the future abounds. In these visions, the future is imagined as a strange, foreign land, beset with problems. And yet, to quote that old adage, tomorrow is the visitor that is always coming but never arrives. The future never arrives because we are assembling it today. We need to work diligently together to piece together a better world. But if we constantly live in fear of what comes next, that future won’t be built. Optimism needn’t be pollyannaish. It only needs to be hopeful of a better world.

#### No impact—it’s limited in scope and explanatory power.

Christophers 15 [Brett Christophers, Institute for Housing and Urban Research, Uppsala University, "The limits to financialization", 2015, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2043820615588153?casa\_token=4407uJ-wcLQAAAAA:3q8k\_qDLMivKZsd3w8OeaOMjvjgkfOhElVeopTgh2vIJODGiA68K2mHVfSbpf9R-agJkrqQiNXJBDw]

‘Financialization’ meaningfully entered the lexicon of the cultural–economic and political–economic literatures on capitalism later than either globalization or neoliberalization. Roughly speaking, if globalization was the new buzzword of the 1990s and neoliberalization—or, in form rather than process terms, neoliberalism—of the 2000s, then financialization is very much the buzzword of the 2010s, although of course neoliberalization has been conceptualized as handmaiden, not replacement, of globalization and financialization, in turn, of both. To be sure, pivotal statements on and conceptualizations of financialization appeared well in advance of the 2010s, and we shall revisit many of these here. But it is in the past half-dozen years—those, not coincidentally, coming after the onset of the global financial crisis—that financialization has seemingly taken root in the critical scholarly vocabulary and consciousness. A Google Scholar search, for example, yields 170 hits for financialization (or financialisation) between 1996 and 2000, 1088 between 2001 and 2005, 5790 between 2006 and 2010, and 12,010 between 2011 and the midpoint of 2014.1

In response to, and in the face of, this mushrooming financialization literature, the present article constitutes, essentially, a call for caution. With scholars from various disciplinary constituencies having enthusiastically invoked the concept in attempting to understand contemporary capitalism and its specificities, and with a critical mass of increasingly breathless and boosterish scholarship on the phenomenon having crystallized, now is the time, the article submits, to pause, breathe in, and carefully (re)evaluate. Are we—not just geographers but other scholarly communities to have invested in financialization—comfortable with our collective, if contested, theorization of the concept? Is it working for us as we want and need it to? Should we simply plow ahead with mobilization and elaboration of the concept broadly along the lines we have been tracing to date?

Having reviewed the state of the field, the article argues that caution is not just advisable but necessary. It makes this case by invoking a multiply constituted idea of limits. Financialization, it suggests, is limited, both conceptually and empirically. As such, in continuing to use the concept—as surely for the foreseeable future we, as a constellation of scholarly communities, will—it is essential to recognize such limits and to think through their implications for the ways we use the concept and for the work that we expect it to do for us. The limits are sufficiently substantive, and their implications sufficiently material, to warrant a tempering of enthusiasm, if not a turn away from the concept altogether. More specifically, we need to be much more wary of relying on the concept and of mobilizing it for the purposes of both categorization and explanation.

The article proceeds in five sections, which respectively correspond to and delineate the five connected types of limits that attach to financialization. The first such limits are analytic. For a concept to be analytically valuable, it should be possible for scholars to invoke it in such a way that it brings recognizability and clarity to the particular topic of analysis; the critical properties or dynamics of the empirical object of investigation are foregrounded, if not comprehensively accounted for, simply by the use of a term whose reproducible coherence offers ready-made analytical expedience and insight. For a variety of reasons, however, not least unchecked and promiscuous conceptual reiteration, the idea of financialization has by now largely lost any coherence that it previously enjoyed: increasingly standing only for a vague notion of ‘the (increased) contemporary importance of finance’, its enrolment today risks raising more questions than it answers.

Does this then mean that the concept is valueless and that it has facilitated no scholarly progress? Absolutely not. But, the article goes on to argue, there are crucial limits to its positive contributions, not least—as discussed in the ‘Theoretic limits’ section—of a theoretic nature. Here the argument is that there are very real limits to the depth and range of genuinely new conceptual insights generated by the positing and theorization of financialization. The central concern in this regard, to be clear, is not so much with the sophistication, rigor, or novelty of theorizations of financialization per se, although as we shall see there are legitimate questions to be asked here, too. Rather, our main concern is with the limits to the power of financialization and its conceptualization to meaningfully advance our theoretical understanding of capitalism’s cultural and political economies more generally.

The third section discusses limits of a very different type. One of, if not the most important contribution of the financialization discourse and ‘movement’ has been of a strategic nature. It has served to make finance a more acceptable, indeed more obligatory, object of study for a range of scholarly communities for whom it historically represented something of an unmentionable and unknowable other. In the process, it has also helped bringing those communities into productive conversation with one another. In other words, it—financialization—has served vital strategic purposes. Yet there are limits to this strategic function, which the third section of the article identifies and reflects critically upon. If financialization’s great contribution has been to alert new constituencies to the significance, broadly defined, of finance, at what point can we say that this contribution is more or less complete?

The latter question of finance’s significance— economic, political, and cultural—is considered explicitly in the article’s fourth section. It argues that notwithstanding the self-evident and demonstrable importance of finance to contemporary social life on all manner of axes, its significance nonetheless risks being overstated, and arguably already has been in influential financialization accounts. The scale of finance’s significance is one aspect of such potential overstatement, and the historical novelty thereof is another. In attempting to understand and account for the possibility of such overstatement, meanwhile, the article invokes, once more, the central trope of limits: a susceptibility to exaggerate finance’s contemporary significance is embedded, it submits, in the limited nature of the optics brought to bear upon contemporary ‘financialized’ phenomena.

To recognize that exaggeration of financialization’s reality as a historical–geographical set of phenomena is conceivable is to recognize, at the same time, that there are material limits—fifth, and finally—to the various processes referred to with that term. In other words, financialization-as- ‘thing(s)’ is no less limited—or, better, no less required to confront limits to its conditions of possibility and its scope for intensification or extension— than financialization-as-concept. But these limits, the article’s last substantive section argues, have ordinarily not been recognized and critically reflected upon, and nor, therefore, have their implications for the discourse of financialization actively been considered. Recognizing and robustly conceptualizing these empiric limits, it is therefore argued, is in fact an indispensable component of the simultaneous process of working through financialization’s analytic and theoretic limits.

#### Subverting norms is worse – it presents a mirage of progress that conflates intellectual flattery with progressive politics and

Ruti 15 [Mari, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, Bloomsbury Publishing, pg. 180-184]

In Chapter 2, I pointed out that Butler's attempt to have it both ways—to denounce the Enlightenment while simultaneously using its resources—leads to conceptual contradictions that cannot easily be resolved. The matter is worth revisiting here in greater detail because it highlights my major disagreement with Butler, namely that her wholesale vilification of autonomy reaches the kinds of hyperbolic ideological heights that cannot be theoretically defended. Indeed, it is in part the predictability of Butler's stance on this issue that explains why I have been so critical of her in this book: that I always know ahead of time how the argument is going to go—autonomy, sovereignty, rationality, normative limits bad; antinormativity, no matter how far-fetched, good—makes me feel the same way I do when I am grading yet another graduate student paper that undertakes the task of "deconstructing" the humanist subject. In the latter instance, it takes all the pedagogical willpower I can conjure up to not write in the margin, "Didn't we already do this circa 1975?" In Butler's case, I suppose I would like some explanation for why the monotonous disparagement of autonomy and related concepts is so important to her.

"This question is worth asking because the problematic of the subject—the question of the proper way to theorize the relationship between autonomy and subjection, agency and abjection, accountability and social determination—has been one of the most divisive issues of contemporary theory. I have already outlined my own position, which is that either-or solutions to this problematic are too one-dimensional, that if human beings are not entirely autonomous, they are not entirely subjected either, which is why we need to theorize both poles of the dichotomy simultaneously. This, refreshingly, is what Allen tries to do, which is one reason I have found her arguments so convincing. Allen explains that her goal "is to offer an analysis of power in all its depth and complexity, including an analysis of subjection that explicates how power works at the intrasubjective level to shape and constitute our very subjectivity, and an account of autonomy that captures the constituted subject's capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation, its capacity to be self-constituting" (PS 2-3). Without an account of subjection, Allen adds, critical theory cannot grasp "the real-world relations of power and subordination along lines of gender, race, and sexuality that it must illuminate if it is to be truly critical"; but without a satisfactory account of autonomy, critical theory "cannot envision possible paths of social transformation" {PS 3). This is why it is important to understand how we can be constituted by power yet capable of constituting ourselves, how we can be limited by our social context yet capable of critical reflection and self-transformation beyond this context.

Undoubtedly even our capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation is socially constituted, so that it would be possible to posit—with Zizek—that this capacity merely renders our subordination more livable. In Zizek's skeptical reading (and this is a possibility I touched on in Chapter 4), what the system wants is precisely that we rebel against it—that we strive for the kind of self transformation that gives us the illusion of being able to distance ourselves from it—because, in the final analysis, our attempts to defy its power merely consolidate this power; as Zizek maintains, in one of his more Foucaultian moments, power thrives on our action of disidentification because it "can reproduce itself only through some form of self-distance, by relying on the obscene disavowed rules and practices that are in conflict with its public norms."2 Yet it is also the case—as Zizek himself repeatedly stresses—that without the capacity for critical reflection and self-transformation our relationship to the big Other would be one of utter subjection.

#### Autonomous weapons are good and solve civilian casualties, every alternative is way worse

Nayyaret al 17, Hira Nayyar, Samuel Wakerley, Pritha Banerjee, Boboi Rahedi, Student Conversations about Professional Responsibilities of the Engineer @ The University of Sheffield, “THE ETHICS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY: SHOULD WE EXPECT BAE SYSTEMS TO CARE?”, https://prestudentconversation.wordpress.com/2017/04/07/group-2/

“There is, in the world in which we all live, the principle of speaking softly but carrying a big stick – and that very often encourages people to negotiate” argued Sir Roger Carr at the recent BAE Systems annual general meeting – “we try and provide our people, our government, our allies with the very best weapons, the very best sticks they can have, to encourage peace.” Applying ethics of care principles to the business of warmongering is useless in the realm of engineering, rather, one must take a pragmatic view of the ethical cycle. The question of whether BAE Systems conducts its advanced weaponry business ethically is grounded by the principle that conflict will always exist; as such, it is human nature for distrust to fester. Hence, a case can be made that to cease the supply of advanced weaponry to responsible nations would in fact not be principled martyrdom, but ethical suicide. As Carr points out, advanced weaponry can often prove a very effective deterrent to conflict in the first place – but furthermore, as an influential western arms dealer, BAE Systems also has the opportunity to minimize collateral damage in war zones. The supply of advanced weaponry with high levels of precision allows for targeted airstrikes that eliminate the specific threat to life posed by the target, with a minimal loss of civilian life. Now contrast this with the alternative of withdrawing supply. Undoubtedly, unprincipled arms distributors would step into cover the gap in the market, supplying less precise weaponry. The most recent major example of aging, unguided weaponry being supplied to a war zone is Russian support of President Assad’s disputed and morally reprehensible regime in Syria – which has since caused a humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. Permitting the growth of such regressive means of conflict (potentially including the rise of chemical weaponry) is the alternative to BAE supplying advanced weaponry, and so abandoning western influence on the global arms market can only lead one way – to a greater disregard for international humanitarian law. In any case, **this cannot be considered a morally acceptable action** – and so by default, if nothing else, the alternative of BAE Systems supplying sophisticated weaponry must be considered ethical. Such rationality illustrates why ethics of care fails to provide an acceptable moral solution in this case.

Utilitarianism and regulation of the arms market

From a utilitarian viewpoint, the sustainment of powerful weaponry enables a country to defend its people and provide assistance in foreign conflicts where there is a suffering population. Doing so arguably protects a majority of people.

# 2NC

### FW

#### GAFAM guarantee US digital domination through digital domination, hardware, and software so targeting big tech companies anticompetitive practices solves – we’ll insert yellow \*\*\*THEY READ ALL OF THESE LINES\*\*\*

Kwet ’19 – (Michael Kwet is a Visiting Fellow at Yale’s Information Society Project. His current areas of research include education technology, the global digital economy, tech startups, safe and smart city initiatives, big data, and Free and Open Source Software. Mike holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Rhodes University in South Africa. “Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South,” 01/14/2019, pg. 5-9)//pshah

Under colonialism, Europeans dispossessed the natives of their land, settled their territories, put them to work as slaves and servants, instituted horrific acts of violence, and perpetuated dependency and plunder through strategic underde- velopment. Corporations played a pivotal role through the ‘pathological pursuit of profit and power’.7 In 1602, the Dutch East India Company became the first modern global corporation. Fifty years later, it initiated European conquest in Southern Africa with the establishment of the Cape Colony. Over the next two centuries, whites seized large swathes of land as colonists expanded into the interior. After the discovery of diamonds and gold, the British and the Afrikaners consolidated the remaining majority of land and further sub- jugated the African population under racist regimes of labour exploitation. In no time flat, a handful of corporations came to dominate large parts of the economy.8 today, a new form of corporate colonisation is taking place. Instead of the con- quest of land, Big tech corporations are colonising digital technology. the fol- lowing functions are all dominated by a handful of US multinationals: search engines (Google); web browsers (Google Chrome); smartphone and tablet oper- ating systems (Google Android, Apple iOS); desktop and laptop operating sys- tems (Microsoft Windows); office software (Microsoft Office, Google G Suite); cloud infrastructure and services (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM); social net- working platforms (Facebook, twitter); transportation (Uber, Lyft); business net- working (Microsoft LinkedIn); streaming video (Google Youtube, Netflix, hulu); and online advertising (Google, Facebook) – among others. GAFAM now comprise the five wealthiest corporations in the world, with a combined market cap exceeding $3 trillion.9 If South Africans integrate Big tech products into their society, the United States will obtain enormous power over their economy and create technological dependencies that will lead to perpetual resource extraction. Early research and case examples suggest the economic impact of Big tech intermediaries is detrimental to local African industries. Murphy, Carmody and Surborg, who studied the role of ICts among small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa’s and tanzania’s wood and tourism indus- tries, found that ICts introduced the dominance of information intermediaries. Increased use of ICts also led to greater worker surveillance in some instances. they concluded that ICt integration is, on balance, benefiting foreign-owned businesses and corporations.10 Similar conclusions can be derived from press accounts of the transportation industry. Since Uber began operating in Johannesburg in 2013, there have been labour strikes and violent clashes in the ‘South African taxi wars’. Several e-hailing taxi murders have been carried out by metered taxi drivers, who have warned that Uber will ‘burn’ if it remains in South Africa. At the same time, many Uber drivers endure onerous working conditions for low pay.11 Uber has had devastating effects in Africa and beyond.12 the company takes around 25 per cent commission for each trip, in addition to hidden costs,13 leading to an outflow of revenue from the local economy to foreign coffers. Moreover, it is able to undercut local markets by offering artificially low prices: Uber can operate at a loss – to the tune of billions – thanks to funding from Wall Street and other wealthy investors.14 With the backing of corporate finance, it leverages predatory subsidies, network effects, Big Data analytics, and the deregulatory effects of its position as an ‘intermediary’ to stamp out competition and colonise the market. Within just two years, Uber sported a net worth of R1.65 billion ($125 million) inside South Africa.15 Similar problems have emerged in the media. In April 2017, the online news outlet *GroundUp* dropped Google Ads from its website. *GroundUp*’s Nathan Geffen explains the Google advertising model is ‘broken’ for publishers who ‘have to put up with poor quality, misleading adverts in exchange for small change’. ‘the problem’, Geffen says, ‘is that nearly all the power in the online advertising relationship lies with Google.’ the ad giant also serves up censorship threats: in one example, Google issued a warning to *GroundUp* for publishing a picture containing a painted bare breast as part of a protest action.16 In November 2017, *Financial Mail*’s Anton harber wrote a feature story deem- ing Google and Facebook ‘the biggest threat to South African news media’.17 Google takes 70 per cent of local online advertising, while social media – led by Facebook – takes another 12 per cent. the major South African media groups are left with just 8 per cent of the pie. the Google and Facebook ‘nemesis’ is an expanding duopoly: the two take 77 per cent of online advertising spend in the US and captured virtually all the ad growth in 2016.18 If this continues, harber exclaims, ‘the big two could have a devastating effect on the media’s role in defin- ing democracy’.19 these early examples provide clear instances of digital colonialism whereby foreign corporations undermine local development, dominate the market, and extract revenue from the Global South, with power obtained primarily through the *structural* domination of digital architecture, which leads to more general forms of *imperial control*. Colonial conquest typically entails dispossession of valuable resources from the native peoples and ownership and control of infrastructure by colonial powers. In many parts of the Global South, critical infrastructure such as railways was designed by foreign imperialists not to benefit the indigenous population, but to service the mother country. In the arrangement that emerged through European colonialism, raw materials were extracted by exploited local labour and shipped back to the empire. In some cases, colonial forces would import the cheap, machine-made industrial products to the villages, undermining local artisans and the capacity to build competitor industries. In Africa and elsewhere, railroads were built from the country interior straight to the ports and military stations, with little ‘spread effect’ to connect up the indigenous people. the architectural design of the production system was not engineered to benefit the local inhabitants, but to ‘serve immediate European needs’.20 Under digital colonialism, foreign powers, led by the US, are planting infrastructure in the Global South engineered for their own needs, enabling economic and cultural domination while imposing privatised forms of governance. to accomplish this task, major corporations design digital technology to ensure their own dominance over critical functions in the tech ecosystem. this allows them to accumulate profits from revenues derived from rent (in the form of intellectual property or access to infrastructure) and surveillance (in the form of Big Data). It also empowers them to exercise control over the flow of information (such as the distribution of news and streaming services), social activities (like social network- ing and cultural exchange), and a plethora of other political, social, economic and military functions mediated by their technologies. the control of code is foundational to digital domination. In *Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace*, Lawrence Lessig famously argued that computer code shapes the rules, norms and behaviours of computer-mediated experiences in ways similar to architecture in physical space (e.g. imperial railways designed for colonisation).21 ‘Code is law’ in the sense that it has the power to usurp legal, institutional and social norms impacting the political, economic and cultural domains of society. this critical insight has been applied in fields like copyright, free speech reg- ulation, Internet governance, blockchain, privacy, and even torts. What has been missed, however, is how US dominance of code – and other forms of digital architecture – usurps other countries’ sovereignty. Digital forms of power are linked through the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware and network connectivity.22 (Software is the set of instructions that define and determine what your computer can do. hardware is the physical equipment used for computer experiences. the network is the set of protocols and standards computers use to talk to each other, and the connections they make.) Software functions as the coded logic that constrains and enables particular user experiences. For example, software determines rules and policies such as whether or not users can post a message anonymously at a website, or whether or not users can make a copy of a copyright-restricted file like an e-book. the rules that a programmer codes into the software largely determine technological freedoms and shape users’ experiences using their devices. thus, software exerts a powerful influence on the behaviour, policies and freedoms of people using digi- tal technology. *Control over software* is a source of digital domination primarily exercised through software licences and hardware ownership. Free Software licences allow people to use, study, modify and share software as they see fit.23 By contrast, non- free software licences grant a software designer control over users by precluding the ability to exercise those freedoms. With proprietary software, the human- readable source code is closed off to the public, and owners usually restrict the ability to use the software without paying. In the case of Microsoft Windows, for example, the public must pay for the programme in order to use it, they cannot read the source code to understand how it works, they cannot change its behaviour by changing the code, and they cannot share a copy with others. thus with proprietary licensing, Microsoft maintains absolute control over how the software works. the same goes for other proprietary apps, like Google Play or Adobe Photoshop.24 By design, non-free software provides the owner power over the user experience. It is authoritarian software. *Control over hardware* is a second source of digital domination. this can take at least three forms: software run on third-party servers, centralised ownership of hardware, or hardware designed to prevent users from changing the software. In the first scenario, software is executed on someone else’s computer. As a result, users are dispossessed of their ability to control it. this is typically accomplished through Software as a Service (SaaS) in the cloud. For example, when you visit the Facebook website, the interface you are provided executes on third-party hardware (i.e. on Facebook’s cloud servers). Because users cannot change the code running on Facebook’s servers, they cannot get rid of the ‘like’ button or change the Facebook experience. ‘there is no cloud’, the saying goes, ‘just some- one else’s computer’. Corporations and other third parties design cloud services for remote control over the user experience. this gives them immense power over individuals, groups and society.25 In the second scenario, people become dispossessed of hardware ownership itself. With the rise of cloud computing, it is possible that hardware manufacturers will soon only offer low-powered, low-memory devices (similar to the terminals of the 1960s and 1970s) and computer processing and data storage will be primarily conducted in centralised clouds. With end-users dispossessed of processing power and storage, software and data would be under the absolute con- trol of the owners and operators of clouds.26 In the third scenario, hardware is manufactured with locks that prevent users from changing the software on the devices. By locking down devices to a pre- determined set of software choices, the hardware manufacturer determines which software is allowed to run when you turn on your device.27 thus, hardware restrictions can prevent the public from controlling their devices, granting device manufacturers power over users. *Control over network connectivity* is a third source of digital domination. Net neutrality regulation proposes that Internet traffic should be ‘neutral’ so that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) treat content flowing through their cables, cel- lular towers and satellites equally. According to this philosophy, those who own the pipes are ‘common carriers’ and should almost never be allowed to manipu- late the data that flows through them.28 this constrains the ability of wealthy media providers to pay for faster content delivery speeds than less wealthy pro- viders (such as grassroots organisations, small businesses, and common people). More importantly, by treating traffic equally, net neutrality prevents network discrimination against various forms of traffic critical to civil rights and liberties. For example, the tor browser facilitates anonymous Internet communications, but the use of the tor network can be detected by ISPs and throttled (i.e. slowed to a crawl).29 Net neutrality prevents this form of discrimination and protects the end user’s freedom to utilise the Internet as they wish, without third-party favouritism, blocking, or throttling. Let us consider some concrete examples as to how software, hardware, and networks constitute sources of power and control related to social justice in the Global South.

#### Imagining a future is the affs advocacy – fiat solves it – we’ll insert blue \*\*\*THEY READ IT TOO\*\*\*

Hui ’19 – (Yuk Hui is a philosopher based in Berlin. He is the author of three monographs: On the Existence of Digital Objects (University of Minnesota Press, 2016), The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics (Urbanomic, 2016), and Recursivity and Contingency (Rowman and Littlefield International, Spring 2019). “What Begins After the End of the Enlightenment?” Eflux 96 January 2019 <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/96/245507/what-begins-after-the-end-of-the-enlightenment/>)//rvs

We need to return to the word “acceleration” itself, since it is too easy to be fooled by an unexamined relation between acceleration and speed. If we recall high school physics, where a = v1-v2/t, acceleration is equal to the change of velocity (from v1 to v2) divided by time. V is velocity, not speed. Velocity is a vector having both magnitude and direction, while speed is mere magnitude. Why not consider another form of acceleration that does not push speed to its extreme, but rather changes the direction of movement, giving technology a new frame and orientation with regard to time and technological development? By so doing, we can also imagine a bifurcation of the future, which instead of moving towards the apocalypse, diverges from it and multiplies. But what does it mean to give technology a new frame? In order to do so, **it is necessary to reflect on how we might reappropriate modern technology by systematically reflecting and working on the question of epistemologies and epistemes in light of multiple cosmotechnics, or simply put, the technodiversity that is historically traceable and still productive.** This is a project I began with my book The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay on Cosmotechnics (2016), in which I use China as an example to elaborate on different conceptualizations of technology and the possibility of conceiving such a technodiversity in history and for the future. The proposal of multiple cosmotechnics—which is not, of course, limited to China—calls for us to reopen the concept of “technics” and reexamine the conditions of technical evolution. 3. Technodiversity and the Bifurcations of the Future Technics is anthropologically universal in the process of hominization—the understanding of the human as a species because it is the exteriorization of memory and the liberation of human organs. With drawing and writing, human beings exteriorized their memories and imaginations; by inventing flint, the ancients liberated their fingers from many activities. We do not reject the notion that there is a universal dimension to technology, but it is only one of the dimensions. From a cosmotechnical standpoint, technics is fundamentally motivated and constrained by particular geographical and cosmological specificities. If we want to respond to the prospect of global self-extinction, we need to return to a carefully elaborated discourse on locality and the places of the human in the cosmos. In order to do so, we need first of all to reopen the question of technology, to conceive of multiple cosmotechnics instead of merely two: a premodern technics and a modern technics. To be sure, we must be careful with the word “locality” and its politics. Nostalgic invocations of tradition or culture can become problematic returns to nationalism, cultural essentialism, and ethnofuturism, when not approached dialectically. Here we are not considering small groups revolting against modern technologies in the name of culture or nature; rather, we are elaborating a general strategy to reappropriate technology by first of all affirming the irreducible multiplicity of technicity. While Simondon has been an inspiration for the concept of cosmotechnics, his own critique fails to articulate technics beyond the tradition of Western Enlightenment humanism he inherited. To propose a pluralism is a gesture which could be attributed to both reactionaries and revolutionaries. Take the example of Herder, the fiercest opponent of Voltaire and the author of the book-length 1774 essay This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity, which argues that cultural experiences, values, and feelings are irreducibly diverse. Can one call Herder a nationalist? Many do consider him—a Lutheran priest, student of Kant, and mentor to Goethe—to be a founding figure of German nationalism and the Volksgeist. However, this view is not universally shared. Meineke once asked: “Did not Herder, when he arose to create a new epoch, proclaim both humanity and nationality?” Philosophers like Hans-Georg Gadamer and Isaiah Berlin also saw in Herder both a populism and pluralism, or as Charles Taylor put it, a populism and an “expressivism.” Herder is considered by some to be a genuine cosmopolitan thinker who roots cosmopolitanism in heterogeneity rather than homogeneity; he affirms differences not by claiming that each culture has a unique essence, but by arguing for the importance of locality and the equality of all cultures. Humans are formed in distinct symbolic and linguistic worlds. Their different forms of knowledge and their different relations to the world and to the earth are not measurable by their advances in modern science and technology. The end of the Enlightenment has to begin by appropriating Herder after Gadamer, Berlin, and Taylor, since theirs is only the first step. We will have to understand the transformative power of heterogeneity instead of retreating to a certain Volk and depending on empathy or sensitivity to resolve tensions within increasingly isolated groupings. As a response to the ecological problems associated with the Anthropocene, anthropologists such as Philippe Descola and others have reopened the question of radical pluralism in a way that considers what is called “multinaturalism” instead of multiculturalism. Because naturalism, which counterposes nature and culture, is very much a product of modernity, it does not capture how nonhumans are perceived in other parts of the world. However, with modernization as a synchronization process, we encounter a tipping point that reopens concepts such as nature and technics which have been inherited as universal without being questioned. This call for pluralism is for us a reminder to consciously reappropriate modern science and technology, to give it a new direction at a time when its planetary spread opens up such a possibility. On the other hand, we may understand Kissinger’s end-of-Enlightenment claim as marking the full realization of a single global axis of time in which all historical times converge into the synchronizing metric of European modernity. It is the moment of disorientation—a loss of direction as well as of the Orient in relation to the Occident. The unhappy consciousness of fascism and xenophobia arises from this inability to orient: as a response, it offers an easy identity politics and an aestheticized politics of technology. More broadly, such a disorientation can be seen as a desirable and necessary deterritorialization of contemporary capitalism, which facilitates accumulation beyond temporal and spatial constraints. War is the technique of disruption par excellence, vastly more effective than Uber and Airbnb. In his 1933 The Hour of Decision: Germany and World-Historical Evolution, Spengler describes the war machine as the only possible response to the geopolitical crisis of the time: “England gained her wealth by battles and not by bookkeeping and speculation … [Germany] had to carry on its wars with foreign money and in the service of that money, and it waged wars over miserable scraps of its own country that one diminutive state took from another.” The prospect of war as a solution was not pursued only in the West: the Kyoto school philosophers also proposed total war as a means of overcoming modernity. Today, could global competition over the development of artificial intelligence and space technology become the new condition of such a war? As Spengler wrote in 1933, certain forces are dragging us backwards. It is worth noting the major similarities between his epoch and ours, but we also need to pay special attention to the differences. Spengler wrote in The Hour of Decision of a certain dogmatic thinking in non-Western civilizations that emerged with modernity and was associated with a colonial mentality: Immemorially old “Fellaheen” peoples such as the Indian and Chinese can never again play an independent part in the world of the great powers. They can change their masters, drive one out—as, for example, the Englishman from India—but it is only to succumb to another. They will never again produce a form of political existence of their own. For that they are too old, too rigid, too used up. This failure is largely due to the fact that the question of technology has never been sufficiently addressed, neither in the West nor elsewhere: technology remains a utility, and there is no way of seeing the kingdom of ends beyond the limits of utility and efficiency. Efficiency is a very important factor of technological innovation, but it has to be measured according to a long-term vision instead of short-term profits. The other thing that holds back the colonial mentality is a cynicism that sees no way out. After all, who can escape the economic and geopolitical competition to master artificial intelligence when technological linearity is identified with the progress of humanity? We can be certain that artificial intelligence will have a significant impact on our societies and economies. If China or Russia slowed their pace of technological innovation, they would lose their competitive edge: Putin already declared to a room full of Russian school children on September, 1 2017 that “whoever leads in AI will dominate the world.” But if technological acceleration and innovation are the common task of the sovereign and capital, human cynicism will only deepen as we feel increasingly helpless in the face of technological systems that displace the human roles in so many processes. **True philosophical thinking can be the only response to this aporia.** I don’t mean to suggest that modern science and technology are evil (not least because they were my first areas of study). Nor am I suggesting that non-European cultures and traditions have been destroyed by evil modern technologies imposed by the West, and that therefore we should give up modern science and technology. The question, rather, is how this historical process can be rethought, and what futures are still available for imagination and realization. If we identify Enlightenment thought with modern technology as an irreversible process guided by universality and rationality, then the only question that remains to be asked is: To be or not to be? But if we affirm that multiple cosmotechnics exist, and that these may allow us to transcend the limit of sheer rationality, then we can find a way out of never-ending modernity and the disasters that have accompanied it. It would be tragic to misunderstand rationality merely as strict and rigid reasoning—unfortunately, it has been often mistaken as such. The history of reason and its relation to nature and technology, from Leibniz to cybernetics and machine learning, has to be constructed and interrogated differently than it has been. Certain reflections on culture may provide a way to understand these different modes of technological thinking. To rediscover multiple cosmotechnics is not to refuse artificial intelligence or machine learning, but to reappropriate modern technology, to give other frames to the enframing (Gestell) at the core of modern technology. If we want to surpass modernity, there is no way to simply reset it as if it were a computer or a smartphone. We must instead escape its global time-axis, escape a (trans)humanism that subordinates other beings to the terms of its own destiny, **and propose a new agenda and imagination of technology that open up new forms of social, political, and aesthetic life and new relations with nonhumans, the earth, and the cosmos.** All of this remains to be thought, since it demands a Nietzschean revaluation of the question of technology, and this is possible only when done collectively. In this sense, we can take Kissinger’s statement not as a target of criticism, but as an invitation to think beyond the end of the Enlightenment, as a challenge to undertake the task of thinking through the plurality of its forms. Perhaps Kissinger’s own closing warning is the most appropriate way to end this critique of him: **“If we do not start this effort soon, before long we shall discover that we started too late.”**

#### Debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions to symbolic politics in favor of more complex, deep understandings of issues – that takes out their link turn and magnifies the link

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily

#### Their affirmation of linguistic indeterminacy and sovereignty challenges to the state feed the conservative playbook---their supposed transgressiveness gives neo-cons justification for unrestrained executive warmaking

**Passavant 10** - Associate Professor of Political Science Habart and William Smith College

(Paul, “Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever,” Constellations, 17 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00614.x)

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.∂ In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.∂ Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.∂ Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy.∂ In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.∂ Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?∂ In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.∂ Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.∂ In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests.∂ Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8∂ In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

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### Case

#### No transition even if a mindset shift happens – elites will cling to power which inevitably causes conflict that upsets the transition

**Koch** and Büchs **19** [Max Koch, Faculty of Social Sciences, Socialhögskolan, Lund University, Milena Büchs, Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing”, Futures Volume 105, January 2019, Pages 155-165, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#!]

The second part of this paper highlighted some of the challenges that we can expect to face from a transition towards degrowth even if attention shifts towards needs satisfaction. A sociological perspective helps to highlight how very deeply rooted the growth principle has become not only for the economic system, but also for a host of other systems that have co-evolved around growthbased capitalism, including the nation state, democracy, the legal, financial, welfare and associated cultural systems. The challenge for the degrowth transition will be that these co-evolved systems need to transform in tandem if wellbeing is to be maintained. It is not yet well understood how this can be organised and which wellbeing implications this transition may have. The social practices perspective highlights that the coupling of these systems around growth-based capitalism is not just a ‘macro’ phenomenon which could be changed through policy making, but also a ‘micro’ phenomenon, embedded in and reproduced by people’s minds and bodies through their daily practices. It is this cultural layer of growth ‘lock in’ that is difficult to change through political means.

In other words, degrowth societies would be societies that are organised according to fundamentally different cultural, social, economic, political and technological principles as the ones that are dominant at the moment, organised around the growth ideology. To emphasise this does not mean to say these current principles and ways in which current institutions are organised around them cannot change. But it helps to increase our sensitivity regarding the monumental extent of change that lies ahead and the likely challenges that this will bring to satisfy people’s (eudaemonic) wellbeing and needs. Radical (and rapid, as it would need to be) social change often involves severe social conflicts as people (especially those in priviledged and powerful positions) have to give up on the material and immaterial benefits, levels of needs satisfaction, identities, and relations to (groups of) other people that the current system is providing them with. When it comes to identities and social relations, Marxists for instance would argue that degrowth would require a dissolution of the distinction between workers and capitalists. A radical transformation of relationships would also be needed in other domains, e.g. between men and women, human and nature, rich and poor countries, current and future generations. The transition to degrowth would need to be organised in ways that carefully manage these conflicts, especially as available material and financial resources will be diminishing over time in this process. An equitable distribution of resources and of decision-making powers will be essential for this process, as the degrowth literature has stressed. A range of very valuable policy proposals have been made that could support these changes, including a reduction of working hours, a basic income, a reform of the financial and monetary system, a cooperatively organised economy, etc. (e.g. Dietz & O’Neill, 2013). In actual fact, there is no shortage of proposals for alternative degrowth policies. The more fundamental challenge is to figure out how to transition towards them, given that they will require radical change in underlying cultural values.

#### That means the transition fails --- state action is critical to achieving degrowth

**Kallis** and D’Alisa **20** [Giorgos Kallis, ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Giacomo D’Alisa, a CES, University of Coimbra, “Degrowth and the State”, Ecological Economics Volume 169, March 2020, 106486, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S092180091831749X]

A foundational question for ecological economics is how, and under what conditions, economies may prosper without growth (Jackson, 2008; Victor, 2008). Steady-state, post-growth or degrowth economists may differ on details of their diagnoses. They mostly agree, however, on the policies they want to see: caps, carbon and green taxes, a basic and a maximum income, or working hour reductions (Kallis, 2018). Such reforms, however, would require a radical change of the political and economic system if they were to be implemented (Blawhof, 2012). A theory of ecological-economic political change cannot but deal with the state, a core force in social change (Wright, 2009). Yet the literature on alternatives to growth is moot on the question of the state. The premise of this paper is that unless ecological economists and advocates of postgrowth/degrowth develop a theory of what the state is, how it works and how it changes, their proposals speak to the void.

#### Grassroots transition efforts fail – policy change is critical

**Kallis** and D’Alisa **20** [Giorgos Kallis, ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Giacomo D’Alisa, a CES, University of Coimbra, “Degrowth and the State”, Ecological Economics Volume 169, March 2020, 106486, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S092180091831749X]

Grassroots actions alone are insufficient from a Gramscian perspective. Greater forces or institutions often limit them. For example, alternative food networks are limited by access to land or high land prices, by legislative rules that prioritize corporate agriculture, by price dumping in ‘liberalized’ food markets, or by the rising costs of public health or education that make it hard for small scale farmers to secure their living. Young, back-to-the-land farmers who want to produce and distribute food differently, end up exploiting themselves, overworking in order to sell at a fair and affordable price. Likewise, co-housing or cooperative housing initiatives are swamped by private capital and gentrification in liberalized housing markets without rent controls. Enter the policies advocated by degrowth economists. These are a means of opening space and releasing resources in support of the new practices, values and common senses alternative economies convey, such as food sovereignty and co-housing. A reduction of working hours and a basic income make it more possible for people to devote time to alternative food networks and gain collective sovereignty on their nutrition. Policies for rent control, price controls or subsidies for alternative housing projects directly benefit new economy initiatives and foster new norms of co-housing and co-habitation.

#### Alt fails and causes transition wars/extinction.

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism]

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines.

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major asdasd upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare.

Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher).

In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power.

The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best climate policy plans all involve technological improvement as a key feature.

#### Growth solves war – data

Lin 17 [Oon Yong; 4/23/2017; International Economics at SUNY Buffalo, under the supervision of Dr. Sandeep Bhakshar, PhD in economics; “Conflict and Trade,” http://geoeconomics.net/2017/09/13/conflict-and-trade/]

CONFLICT AND TRADE TODAY

In the post-cold war era, actual conflicts are relatively few and far between especially between developed nations due to advances in military hardware [nuclear options]. Conflicts took on other forms such as economic warfare and proxy wars. Fortunately, advances in military technology were met with advances in international relations which led to the founding of intergovernmental organizations in the 20th-century.

Trade in the modern context can be examined through globalization which serves as an all-encompassing word that represented progress, cultural exchange and increased trade. Development took off in the 1980s to 1990s, most notably from 1990 to 1996, capital inflows to developing countries increased by a massive 600% (Stiglitz, 2006). The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995, absorbing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the organization enabled countries to have a combined platform to address international trade issues which developed and developing countries would both benefit in a world that was accelerating quickly in terms of trade.

China’s control of rare earth mineral exports in the global market and the usefulness of the WTO is an example worth observing. China has an effective 97% control of the rare-earth elements market (Müller, Schweizer, & Seiler, 2016). It posed an issue as the Chinese government applied export quotas, causing global firms that use these minerals to be fearful of a supply issue due to the concentration of the source. Rare earth metals were useful in many applications and that contributed to the concern, United States firms used them for several product developments ranging from technological turbines to lab purposes such as for their magnetic properties. In 2014, an argument was brought up to the World Trade Organization [WTO] by the European Union, United States, and Japan in 2012 about the control of rare earth exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The timing was nearly 11 years after the accession of China to the WTO, the panel concluded in 2014 that China’s export tariffs on rare earth exports were inconsistent with their WTO obligations. A study conducted by Müller et. al. (2016) begs to differ and found that U.S. firms could have adopted defensive actions such as stockpiling these materials and that export control effects were not overtly damaging after China has joined the World Trade Organization. But it remained apparent that the Chinese government did use its policies to benefit Chinese firms at the expense of non-domestic companies before they had joined the WTO. On 20 May 2015, China responded to the WTO’s request to conform to its panel’s recommendations and to fulfill its obligations to WTO law. China accepted the panel’s judgment, and the issue was resolved amicably.

Bilateral agreements that increase cooperation through trade can also help reduce potential conflict. In 2010, a free trade agreement known as the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement was initiated between ROC Taiwan and PRC China, details of the agreement were finalized in June 2013. The deal’s results were twofold, firstly Taiwan benefited from the trade potential that China provided. Secondly, the agreement led to reduced pressure by PRC China on ROC Taiwan’s agenda of pursuing free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore (Kan & Morrison, 2013). The change in China’s political stance during that time allowed ROC Taiwan to ink deals in quick succession, initially [ANZTEC] with New Zealand on the 10th of July 2013, and subsequently with Singapore [ASTEP] on 7th November 2013. Bernard Cole of the National War College in Washington, DC shares that the possibility of ROC Taiwan and PRC China conflict has been reduced (Navarro, 2016) and the de-escalation can be partially attributed to the constant flow of trade between both countries.

The most revolutionary organization for trade was the formation of the intergovernmental organization known as the European Union [EU]. The EU was founded after World War II [the deadliest war] to prevent future wars. The EU expressed the primary motivation for the formation, “The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.” (European Union, 2017, para 2). At its founding the EU had six member countries, today it has 28 member countries some of which are fully committed to its economic and monetary union. Furthermore, the EU is at the forefront of democratic thought and champions a broad range of issues such as human rights, internet privacy, and democracy.

In support of the idea for the notion of trade and growth bringing peace to society, A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off Professors Chatagnier and Castelli argues that

To sustain growth (a basic requirement for every industrialized economy), governments and entrepreneurs must reinvest profits in innovation. Political leaders also benefit, as they can extract more revenue from a richer society. Within industrialized economies, war threatens this virtuous mechanism of investment, innovation, profits, and taxes, rendering it materially unprofitable. (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016)

Their argument was based on the assumptions that industrialized economies which have grown to generate additional revenue for society, in general, tends not to prefer wars as it was contrary to the needs of an industrialized economy (Jentleson, 2007). Advocating that an extra dollar spent on military expenditures is one less dollar spent on economic growth for the society. They found that over the last fifty years from 2016, wars were not profitable and that industrialization does indeed reduce a nation’s incentive to enter conflicts due to the economic changes of industrialization. Additionally, the authors recognized that trade between industrialized societies potentially leads to peaceful attitudes (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016).

#### The solution is not wholesale rejection of financilzation but a recommitment to ensuring finance is socially efficient – history proves it’s a massive boon for development which is good

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Servaas, “Financialization and Economic Development: A Debate on the Social Efficiency of Modern Finance,” Development and Change: Volume49, Issue2 FORUM 2018 March 2018 Pages 302-329, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dech.12385

The global financial crisis has been followed by 10 dire years of economic stagnation, high and rising inequalities in income and wealth, historically unprecedented levels of indebtedness, and mounting uncertainty about jobs and incomes in most nations. The crisis conditions crystallized into a steadily increasing popular dissatisfaction with the political and economic status quo of those supposedly ‘left behind by (financial) globalization’; a dissatisfaction which amplified into a ‘groundswell of discontent’ — to use the exact words of the IMF's Managing Director Christine Lagarde (2016). Angry and anxious electorates were transformed by demagogues into election‐winning forces, as the British Brexit vote, Trump's (2016) and Erdogan's (2017) election victories in the US and Turkey, and recent political changes (toward authoritarianism) in Brazil, Egypt, the Philippines and India all attest. Secular stagnation and political instability are feeding a widespread sense that capitalism, as a historical phenomenon, is now in a critical condition — and to some the question is no longer whether but how capitalism will end (see Streeck, 2014). This is not the question of the present Debate, however, which instead asks how and why the global political economy morphed from post‐WWII ‘mixed’ industrial capitalism to a neoliberal ‘rentiers’ delight’, and how to confront the Panglossian logic and arguments used by (financial) economists to legitimize the financialized order as the ‘best of all possible worlds’.

Taken together, the 10 contributions in this Debate lay to rest the Hayekian claim that unregulated market‐based finance is socially efficient — the macro‐ and microeconomic impacts of the rise to dominance of financial markets on capital accumulation, growth and distribution have overwhelmingly been found to be deleterious (Epstein). Market‐based finance is no longer funding the real economy (Epstein; Jayadev, Mason and Schröder), but rather engaging in a self‐serving strategy of rent‐seeking (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh; Mader), licensed larceny à la Hildyard (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh; Mader), exchange rate and global stock market speculation (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner), derivatives speculation (Keucheyan; Clapp and Isakson) and collateral mining (Gabor; Lavinas) — asphyxiating economic development in the process. As John Maynard Keynes (1930 1972: 131) wrote in his article ‘The Grand Slump of 1930’, ‘there cannot be a real recovery … until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive borrowers are brought together again …. Seldom in modern history has the gap between the two been so wide and so difficult to bridge’. As the Debate articles show, the gap between finance and the real economy may be even wider today than in the 1930s.

This does not mean, however, that Schumpeter and Gerschenkron were wrong in calling the banker the ‘ephor’ of capitalism and a ‘phenomenon of development’. Finance can positively contribute to economic development, something which indeed is ‘almost too obvious for serious discussion’ as Miller wrote, but only when the ‘ephor’ is ‘governed’ and ‘directed’ by state regulation to structure accumulation and distribution into socially useful directions (Epstein; Jayadev, Mason and Schröder). The East Asian miracle economies prove the point that finance can be socially efficient if bankers can be made to work within the ‘developmental mindset’, the institutional arrangements and political compulsions of a ‘developmental state’, as argued by Wade. China's recent move to (securities) market‐based finance may be the beginning of the unravelling of its growth miracle (Gabor; see also BIS, 2017). Rather than letting financial markets discipline the rest of the economy and the whole of society, finance itself has to be disciplined by a countervailing social authority which governs it to act in socially desirable directions.

One famous account in the Talmud tells about Rabbi Hillel, a great sage, who, when he was asked to explain the Torah in the time that he could stand on one foot, replied: ‘Do not do unto others that which is repugnant to you. Everything else is commentary’. If there is a one‐foot summary of the 10 articles in the Debate, reviewed in this Introduction, it is this: ‘Finance is a terrible ephor, but, if and when domesticated, can be turned into a useful servant. Everything else is commentary’.